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Abstract and Keywords
The dramatic impairment of motor and body awareness, often 
observed in brain-damaged patients, can shed light on the 
mechanisms implicated in the emergence of conscious 
experience of the self as an acting body. This chapter first 
reviews evidence that shows, in patients affected by 
anosognosia for hemiplegia, how the activation of normal 
intentional process can give rise to false beliefs of movement 
when predictive models of motor behavior cannot be 
confronted with sensory feedbacks, due to damage of motor 
control systems. In brain-damaged patients with motor and 
somatosensory deficits, puzzling cognitions and behaviors can 
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sometimes be observed where patients can misidentify other 
people’s limbs as their own, showing a pathological 
embodiment (E+) of others’ body parts (a condition called 
somatoparaphrenia). The chapter notes that in this condition 
the sense of agency and the intentional attitude can be 
“normally” transferred to the movements of another’s limbs.
Keywords:   impairment, brain damage, anosognosia for hemiplegia
Introduction
Interaction with other individuals and with the environment is 
mediated by motor actions through which people try to 
achieve their goals and purposes. Action is generated through 
a chain of neurobiological events that is often not available to 
consciousness, although we are usually aware of moving (or 
not moving) different parts of our body. Therefore, one has the 
conscious knowledge that, for instance, one’s hand is moving, 
as well as intentional attitudes, defined as the felt urge to 
make a movement that precedes the actual execution of a 
specific motor act. We also feel a strong sense of controlling 
our own actions (usually indicated as “sense of agency”), and 
that our own body performs those actions. The normal 
integration between the different aspects of conscious motor 
control and the feeling of body ownership (i.e., the experience 
that bodily states are so clearly and inexorably “mine”) are 
considered to be crucial for the building up of a coherent 
sense of identity. Therefore, it has been proposed that one of 
the most fruitful ways to refer to the conscious self is to 
conceive it as intimately related to the concept of body “as 
source or power to action, i.e. as the variety of motor 
potentialities that define the horizon of the world in which we 
live” (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010). Accordingly, in the present 
chapter, we shall review some studies that investigate which 
processes are (p.372) critical when people have beliefs about 
moving parts of their bodies, and which kind of body 
experiences are involved in shaping and/or modeling the 
various senses of motor self-awareness (see also Tsakiris, 
Chapter 10 of this volume). Neurophysiological and 
neuropsychological evidence suggest that the neural bases of 
the different kinds of self-awareness can be kept relatively 
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distinct and are discretely organized (Spinazzola et al., 2008). 
The relation between them therefore needs to be clarified in 
order to capture the real nature and structure of the self.
Agency and Intention
The sense of agency can be defined as the feeling that I am 
the one who generates a willed action. The relation between 
agency and intention seems to be strong: the experience of 
being in control of one’s own movements, and of their effects, 
is stronger when there is an explicit intentional selection of a 
motor action than when the same movements are externally 
generated by a mechanical device or by a transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS)–induced stimulation of the motor 
cortex (Haggard & Clark 2003). For instance, in a recent 
study, healthy subjects pressed a button, which caused a tone 
to occur on some trials. Their task was to judge the time they 
became aware of either pressing the key, or of hearing the 
tone. When the key press caused the tone, participants judged 
their key press as occurring later, and the tone earlier, than 
when the two events occurred alone. The effect did not occur 
when an involuntary movement (caused by stimulating the 
motor cortex using TMS) was followed by a tone, or when 
subjects judged the timing of two causally related external 
sensory events. This “temporal attraction” strongly suggests 
that there is a tight link between our experience of agency and 
motor intentionality. Other evidence confirming how the sense 
of agency is modulated by motor intentionality comes from 
brain-damaged patients affected by an unusual form of limb 
misattribution and will be discussed later in this chapter (see 
E+ patients).
Intention and Motor Awareness
The relation between conscious intention and motor 
awareness has been studied in different areas of psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience. In a seminal study, Libet and 
coworkers (Libet et al., 1983) showed that although the 
awareness of the intention to move (the “W judgment”) 
anticipates the actual movement by about 200 milliseconds, it 
follows by hundreds of milliseconds (instead of preceding) the 
electrophysiological preparatory activity related to movement 
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(readiness potential), usually registered on the scalp over the 
supplementary motor area. These results strongly suggested 
that the conscious experience of (p.373) intentionality is a 
consequence of brain activity related to the process of 
programming and selecting the correct movements for action 
(Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Libet et al., 1983). Libet and 
coworkers also asked their subjects to estimate the time at 
which they became aware of executing a voluntary movement 
(“M judgment,” or motor awareness). Participants’ timing of 
the M moment followed the timing of the W moment, as 
expected. But, surprisingly, it precedes, instead of follows, the 
actual initiation of the movement by 50 to 80 milliseconds. 
This outcome suggests that motor awareness emerges before
any sensory feedback reaches the brain, thus showing that the 
feeling that a movement is produced is not linked in an 
absolute way to the feedback coming from the moving muscles 
and joints. Although counterintuitive, these results are 
consistent with other studies that showed that the sensations 
associated with the actual execution of movements could be 
unnecessary for the construction of movement awareness. 
Similarly, Fourneret and Jeannerod (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 
1998) concluded that we are aware of the movement we
intend to perform, rather than of the movement we actually
produce. Therefore, although proprioception and vision are 
fundamental aspects of our capacity of judging the course and 
the consequences of a motor event, motor awareness is 
somehow independent from their operations, but is strictly 
related to intentionality. Blakemore and colleagues 
(Blakemore & Frith, 2003) suggested that motor awareness 
must correspond to some neural signal that (a) precedes the 
movement, (b) follows the development of a conscious 
intention, and (c) is formed prior to the processing of sensory 
feedback. They proposed a model of how the control of motor 
systems relates to various forms of awareness (“the 
comparator model”; Haggard, 2005; Wolpert et al., 1995). 
According to the model, once the appropriate motor 
commands are selected for the execution of the appropriate 
action, a prediction of the sensory consequences of the 
movement is formed and would be compared with the 
feedbacks associated with the actual execution of the intended 
movement. This prediction is the signal upon which motor 
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awareness is constructed. Note that because this signal 
precedes, instead of follows, sensory feedback, it is the ideal 
candidate for being the basis for Libet’s participants’ M 
judgment. Moreover, it is also consistent with Fourneret and 
Jeannerod’s (1998) conclusion. Data on brain-damaged 
patients confirm this model and shall be discussed later in the 
chapter.
Motor Cognition and Body Ownership
As mentioned earlier, a fundamental component of the 
conscious feeling of moving is the sensation that we are acting 
with part of our own body (p.374) (see also Tsakiris, Chapter
10 of this volume). Indeed, normal functioning of processes 
underlying intentional actions and the veridical construction of 
motor awareness entail a normal sense of body ownership 
(Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The processes that are involved in 
the construction of normal body awareness are, however, far 
from being clear. It has been suggested that several different 
components contribute to our feeling of body ownership. 
According to some views, conscious, top-down, cognitive 
representation that also incorporates semantic knowledge 
about the body are thought to interact with unconscious, 
bottom-up, dynamic representation that relies on 
proprioceptive information from the muscles, joints, and skin 
(Head & Holmes, 1911). This latter representation is used to 
control posture and to enable and shape motor actions. The 
coherent sense of body ownership that would emerge from 
these representations can be, however, affected by different 
experimental interventions that manipulate the sensory-motor 
state of the body. For example, synchronous touches of a 
visible rubber hand and the participants’ hand (hidden from 
sight) produce the sensation of feeling the touch on the rubber 
hand, as well as a compelling feeling of ownership of that hand 
(the “rubber hand illusion”; e.g., (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998;
Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Farnè et al., 
2000; Longo et al., 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). This 
illusion exploits the brain’s predilection for integrating 
congruent tactile, visual, and proprioceptive stimuli, even 
when they are in contrast with one another. Recent studies 
also demonstrated that we may actively incorporate tools in 
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our body representation, so that the tool changes both our 
perception of body extension (Sposito et al., 2012) and our 
mapping of the external world (Berti & Frassinetti, 2000;
Longo & Lourenco, 2006). Interestingly, these studies showed 
that “tool embodiment” was present only when the tool was 
used for performing a voluntary action, suggesting that only 
intentional tool use shapes one’s own body schema. 
Accordingly, we shall show the flip side of this principle and 
present evidence that altered feeling of body ownership 
directly affects motor cognition. The studies that we shall 
review in this chapter aim at clarifying the relation between 
agency, intention, and body ownership from the point of view 
of pathological behavior, observed in brain-damaged patients 
with dramatic impairment of motor and body awareness.
Motor Awareness Deficits and Their Relation 
with Agency and Intention
In this part of the chapter, the relation between motor 
awareness, motor intention, and agency will be discussed 
referring to recent experimental studies (p.375) in brain-
damaged patients affected by anosognosia for hemiplegia 
(AHP) and motor neglect who, in different ways, deny their 
contralesional motor disorders.
An important contribution for the understanding of the neural 
bases of motor awareness comes from the study of a 
pathological condition in which movement awareness is 
dramatically impaired. AHP patients suffering from right-brain 
damage develop a paresis of the left side of the body but 
obstinately deny their motor deficit, and when asked to move 
their paralyzed limb they claim to have performed the action 
required by the examiner (see Bottini et al., 2010; Fotopoulou, 
2012; Orfei et al., 2007; Pia et al., 2004; Spinazzola, Bellan, 
Pia, & Berti, 2014). It has been proposed that AHP might be 
explained as a domain-specific disorder of motor control (Berti 
& Pia, 2006; Gold et al., 1994; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010;
Spinazzola et al., 2008).
Several imaging studies of intact brains show that the cortical 
network for conscious awareness of action overlaps with that 
for control of movement (e.g., (Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009). 
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Accordingly, it has been demonstrated that AHP follows from 
brain damage to the same cortical network responsible for 
motor monitoring. This network is located in the lateral 
premotor and insular cortex (Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et 
al., 2010; Garbarini et al., 2013b; Karnath et al., 2005; Moro et 
al., 2011; Pia et al., 2013b; Vocat et al., 2010). Consequently, 
the well-established framework of a forward model of normal 
motor control (Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Wolpert et al., 1995) 
has been employed to predict the pattern of intact and 
impaired neurocognitive mechanisms, pinpointing the 
distorted motor awareness of AHP patients. As already 
mentioned, the model posits that, when a subject has the 
intention to move and the appropriate motor commands are 
selected and sent to the appropriate motor areas, a prediction 
(forward model) of the sensory consequences of the movement 
itself is formed based on the efference copy of the 
programmed motor act. This would be subsequently matched 
(by a comparator system) with the actual sensory feedback 
(see also Gold et al., 1994). The efference copy is the signal 
from which motor awareness is constructed. This model has 
two important implications. First, motor awareness would, 
counterintuitively, precede movement execution, instead of 
following it. This entails that whenever a sensory prediction is 
formed, motor awareness emerges before the availability of 
any sensory feedback. Second, motor awareness is evaluated 
against the sensory feedback by the operation of the 
comparator system that, among other functions, can 
differentiate between movement/no-movement conditions. 
Within this framework, it has been proposed that, in AHP 
patients, damage to the comparator processes would alter the 
monitoring of voluntary actions, thus impairing the ability to 
distinguish between movement and no-movement states. The 
(non-veridical) feeling of movement in AHP would then arise 
from an intact (p.376) motor intentionality, assisted by the 
normal activity of the brain structures that implement the 
intention-programming system (Berti & Pia, 2006; Berti et al., 
2007; Garbarini et al., 2012; Pia et al., 2013b; Spinazzola et 
al., 2008). Several studies clearly demonstrated preserved 
movement intentionality in AHP patients; first, AHP patients 
may show normal proximal muscle electrical activity in the 
affected side when they believe they are moving the plegic 
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limb (Berti et al., 2007; Hildebrandt & Zieger, 1995). Second, 
their subjective experience of willed actions is strictly related 
to their preserved intentionality. For instance, AHP patients 
falsely detect the movement of their plegic arm when they 
intend to move it, but do not detect movement when they do 
not have intention (Fotopoulou et al., 2008). Recently, we 
directly demonstrated that the motor programs for the 
affected limbs of AHP patients are identical to those that 
govern normal movement execution, implying no deficit in 
generating motor intentions (Garbarini et al., 2012; Pia et al., 
2013b). We did this by taking advantage of the difficulties of 
bimanual motor tasks. When both hands move simultaneously, 
strong coupling effects arise and neither hand is able to 
perform independent actions successfully (see Swinnen, 2002, 
for a review). This conflict stems largely from internal motor 
programming rather than from the on-line feedback coming 
from movement execution (Drewing et al., 2004; Franz & 
Ramachandran, 1998; Spencer et al., 2005; but see Mechsner 
et al., 2001, for a different point of view). We expected that, in 
AHP patients, these bimanual interference effects should be 
present, because motor programs and sensory predictions are 
both present, despite the absence of movement and sensory 
feedback for the affected hand. Using bimanual motor tasks, in 
which AHP patients were asked to simultaneously perform 
movements with both hands, we found that the movements of 
the intact hand were influenced by the intended movements of 
the paralyzed hand, although these movements were, of 
course, not actually executed. This influence produced both 
spatial (Garbarini et al., 2012) and temporal (Pia et al., 2013b) 
coupling effects, comparable to those found in healthy 
subjects actually performing bimanual tasks. Examples of 
spatial bimanual coupling, for both healthy subjects and AHP 
patients, are shown in Figure 17.1 A and B. Recently, it has 
been showed that the spared intention-programming system 
can affect other distal kinematic parameters of the healty 
hand as grip aperture (Piedimonte, in press). These findings in 
AHP patients suggest that their motor awareness may be 
constructed from a normal intentional process, even in 
absence of movement execution.
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An intriguing 
contrast to 
AHP was 
provided by 
patients 
without 
hemiplegia 
who were 
affected by 
the distinct 
neurological 
syndrome of 
motor neglect 
(MN). Indeed, 
MN can, in 
some ways, be considered “the neurological opposite” of AHP. 
Sometimes described as “pseudo-hemiplegia” (Laplane & 
Degos, (p.377) (p.378) 1983), and often interpreted as the 
consequence of a damage to intentional motor circuits (Berti 
et al., 2007; Gold et al., 1994), MN is characterized by 
underutilization of the contralesional limb in the presence of 
normal strength, reflexes, and sensibility and thus preserved 
potential for actual movement on the affected side. Crucially, 
when MN patients are asked to perform bimanual movements, 
they only perform ipsilesional hand movements (Laplane & 
Degos, 1983), even though (unlike AHP cases) they are 
actually capable of moving the contralesional hand. However, 
unlike AHP patients or normal controls, MN cases did not 
show any coupling effect (Garbarini et al., 2012). This pattern 
was also obtained with HP cases (without anosognosia), even 
though MN patients differ in being physically capable of 
moving the contralesional limb (see Figure 17.1 C and D). The 
MN cases provide an interesting contrast to the AHP cases. 
The former are non-plegic but apparently lacking intention/
planning, whereas the latter are plegic but still maintain 
intentions/plans for the affected hand.
Although AHP and MN are different in terms of motor 
intention and motor planning, it has been recently 
demonstrated that they are both characterized by lack of 
awareness for the motor impairment (Garbarini et al., 2013a). 
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Figure 17.1  A modified version of a 
Circles-Lines task (Franz et al., 1991) was 
used to investigate the spatial bimanual 
coupling. Participants were asked to 
draw circles and lines, either performing 
unimanual drawing movements—vertical 
lines with the right (intact) hand—or 
bimanual movements—vertical lines with 
the right hand and simultaneously, circles 
with the left (paralyzed) hand. In normal 
subjects, we know that the trajectory of 
the right hand drawing lines tends to 
assume an oval shape (i.e., more spatial 
error) when the other hand must 
concurrently draw circles, compared to 
unimanual conditions, indicating that the 
motor programs for the hand drawing 
circles can affect the motor programs of 
the hand drawing lines, to produce a 
bimanual interference effect (Franz et al., 
1991). We predicted that, if patients with 
anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) do 
intend and plan movements with their 
paralyzed hand, the lines drawn by the 
intact hand should become more oval 
when the patients are requested to draw 
a circle concurrently with their plegic 
hand, as found in normal subjects. 
Different results were expected in 
hemiplegic patients fully aware of their 
motor deficits (hemiplegic patients 
without AHP) and in patients without 
hemiplegia who do not intend/plan 
contralesional movements in bimanual 
situations (motor neglect [MN] patients). 
In Figure 17.1, examples of subjects’ 
right-hand trajectory in the crucial 
bimanual Circle-Line condition are 
shown. Note the increased ovalization for 
healthy controls (A) and for hemiplegic 
patients with AHP (B), but not for 
hemiplegic patients without AHP (C) or 
patients with MN (D).
This finding 
can be 
explained 
within the 
computational 
model of 
motor control 
described 
earlier. More 
precisely, 
denial 
behavior in 
AHP patients 
may be due to 
direct damage 
to the 
comparator 
system, which 
cannot detect 
the mismatch 
between the 
intended but 
unexecuted 
action. The 
evident 
feeling of 
movement 
that AHP 
patients 
(erroneously) 
experience 
would then 
arise from 
intact 
structures 
implementing 
motor 
intentionality. 
Conversely, a 
deficit at the 
intention-
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programming level can explain MN. Here, brain damage 
causes an inability to form motor intentions; if the intention to 
move is defective, motor planning is prevented. Because the 
comparator, although working properly, does not receive any 
information about movement planning, it cannot interpret the 
lack of movements as aberrant (Gold et al., 1994). Therefore, 
MN patients are completely unaware of the lack of any 
execution, not because of a direct damage to the comparator 
system, as it has been proposed for AHP patients, but because 
they cannot discover the abnormality of their behavior, since 
they do not attempt to make any movement.
In summary, the evidence described here, in AHP patients, 
suggests that conscious intention to move can be experienced 
without actual movement. The cerebral areas that seem to be 
involved in this process are the mesial-frontal and posterior-
parietal areas (spared in AHP patients) for the intentional 
component of the motor act, and the premotor and insular 
cortices (damaged in AHP patents) for the process of 
construction of motor awareness. It seems logical that the 
sense of agency, the feeling that “I” am the one who is 
controlling the movements, should be related to the presence 
of an ongoing action (p.379) (Haggard, 2005). However, 
pathological conditions in which the presence of actions is 
dissociated from both the sense of agency and conscious 
intention have been described. For instance, in the anarchic 
hand syndrome, patients perform actions coherent in respect 
to environmental stimuli that do not correspond to the 
patient’s conscious free will (see Rowe & Wolpe, Chapter 18 of 
this volume). These patients have intact motor awareness and 
motor function, but they feel that it is not their “self” that is in 
charge of the decision of moving. In contrast, anosognosic 
patients not only believe that their left limbs can move, but 
they are always convinced that they are the ones who move 
the arm. In other words, they never doubt their authorship 
once they have programmed a movement, despite the 
impossibility of performing it. Moreover, they seem to have 
intact, although decontextualized, motor intention: they try to 
make movements with the paralyzed limbs, both 
spontaneously and under request. This picture suggests that, 
although the sense of agency can be present without any 
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ongoing motor activity, it is tightly linked to the feeling of 
intention to move, even when that feeling is constructed on 
pathological beliefs.
Body Awareness Deficits and Their Relation with 
Agency and Intention
In this section of the chapter, the relation between motor 
awareness, motor intention, and agency will be discussed, 
referring to recent experiments carried out in some patients 
who, despite being aware of their contralesional sensory-
motor deficits, believe that someone else’s limb is attached to 
them.
In right-brain–damaged patients with motor and 
somatosensory impairments, a body awareness deficit can 
sometimes be observed (a disturbance called 
somatoparaphrenia). Patients may feel a sense of strangeness 
toward contralesional limbs that may be felt as separated from 
the patients’ body. The more frequent manifestation of this 
disorder is characterized by a sense of disownership, which is 
the delusional belief that the contralesional limbs do not 
belong to one’s own body but to another person (Jenkinson, 
Haggard, Ferreira, Fotopoulou, 2013; Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). 
Recently, an anatomical account of somatoparaphrenia as 
delusion of disownership has been proposed (Gandola et al., 
2012), suggesting a crucial involvement of white matter and 
subcortical gray structures (thalamus, basal ganglia, and 
amygdala). Recently we observed the case of a 
somatoparaphrenic patient who attributed his contralesional 
arm to his brother. He claimed that when the nurses took the 
blood from his arm they were actually taking the blood from 
his brother’s arm and expressed his unhappiness about the 
nurses needlessly intervening to take blood from his brother’s 
arm, when his brother was demonstrably healthy. Once the 
somatoparaphrenia recovered, the patient not only regained 
consciousness of his own (p.380) left arm, but also 
remembered his delusional behavior. Crucially, he reported 
having previously held the false belief that his left arm 
belonged to his brother (unpublished case).
Action Generation, Intention, and Agency in Motor 
and Body Awareness Deficits
Page 13 of 25
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: 
Universita di Torino; date: 13 June 2016
The possibility that an opposite behavior exists, that is, 
patients who misidentify other people’s limbs as if they were 
their own, has been rarely considered. However, in recent 
studies (Garbarini & Pia, 2013; Garbarini et al., 2013b;
Garbarini, Fornia, et al., 2014; Garbarini, Fossataro, et al., 
2015; Pia et al., 2013a), we observed this behavior in a sample 
of hemiplegic and/or hemianesthesic patients. While they did 
not explicitly deny that their contralesional (left) limbs 
belonged to themselves (as in the somatoparaphrenic delusion 
of disownership), they claimed that the examiner’s left hand 
was their own whenever it was positioned, in egocentric 
coordinates, on the table next to their real left hand. This 
delusion of ownership, although resembling the “rubber hand 
illusion” (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), was spontaneous and not 
induced by any experimental procedure. Patients treated and 
cared for the experimenter’s left arm as if it were their own, 
showing a consistent embodiment of an alien hand in their 
own body schema. Because of this pathological embodiment, 
we named them E+ patients. Interestingly, this phenomenon 
occurs not only with a static alien hand but also when 
movements are present, that is, when the examiner moved his 
or her left hand, patients claimed that they were moving their 
own (paralyzed) hand.
It is worth noting that, as mentioned earlier, at the time of 
testing E+ patients did not show any explicit form of 
disownership, never spontaneously reporting delusional 
beliefs about the contralesional body parts. Accordingly, when 
only their left hand was present, they correctly identified it as 
their own left hand. However, when both the own and the 
alien hands were present, not only did they misidentify the 
alien hand as their own, but they also identified their own left 
hand as alien, affirming that it belonged to someone else, thus 
showing an explicit sense of disownership. This suggests that 
the two delusional behaviors (disownership of the own hand 
and ownership of an alien hand) may coexist in the same 
patients, though directed at different objects (see also
Kammers et al., 2011; Moseley et al., 2008, for similar results 
on the rubber hand illusion). The fact that sometimes the 
disownership behavior is immediately evident while another 
time it emerges only as a consequence of the alien hand 
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misattribution may suggest that these two forms of body 
unawareness lay on a continuum, possibly characterizing 
different phases (acute/sub-acute/chronic) of the disease or 
different intensity of the deficit. Furthermore, the E+ patients’ 
lesion pattern seems consistent with that described in 
previous studies on neural correlates of the delusion of 
disownership (Gandola et al., 2012; Garbarini et al., 2013b).
(p.381) Starting from the clinical description of these cases, 
different questions can be addressed: Can we really 
incorporate into our body schema the body parts of others, 
altering our sense of body ownership? In other words, is “my” 
body schema fixed and immutable and does it correspond only 
to “me,” or can part of others’ bodies become part of my 
sensory-motor representations? And if the answer to the last 
question is positive, does this incorporation influence how we 
consciously perceive our body? Body image and body 
perception would therefore be extended to others’ body parts, 
so that the stimulation of embodied alien hand may elicit 
subjective sensation specific to our own body. Furthermore, to 
what extent, given the tight link between body and motor 
representations, does an altered sense of body ownership 
affect patients’ intentional attitude and their motor awareness 
and sense of agency? To answer these questions, we 
conducted a series of experiments, some of them still in 
progress, aiming at verifying the consequences of the altered 
body awareness on the patients’ sensory-motor parameters.
We investigated the somatosensory domain (Pia et al., 2013a;
Garbarini et al., 2014), reasoning that the pathological 
embodiment observed in E+ patients is an ideal condition to 
examine whether tactile/pain sensations can be “transferred” 
to an alien arm subjectively experienced as own. Patients (with 
and without the delusion) and healthy controls were tested 
with a pinprick protocol to assess pain perception. In the own 
hand condition, participants placed their arms on a table and 
the hand dorsum (either of the right or of the left hand) was 
stimulated. In the alien hand condition, the co-experimenter’s 
left or right arm was placed alongside the participants’ left or 
right arm, respectively, and the left or right co-experimenter’s 
hand dorsum was stimulated. In both conditions, participants 
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had to rate the perceived sensation on a Likert scale. We 
hypothesized that, if the false belief of owning an alien arm is 
not a mere verbal confabulation but, rather, the result of a 
profound embodying mechanism that affects the E+ patients’ 
sensory processing, then this should paradoxically produce a 
feeling of pain not only in the own condition, when the stimuli 
are actually applied on the patients’ own hand, but also in the 
alien condition, when stimuli are applied onto the co-
experimenter’s left hand. The results of a first behavioral 
experiment (Pia et al., 2013) confirmed these predictions, 
showing that a body part of another individual can become, in 
a pathological condition, so deeply embedded in one’s own 
somatosensory representation to have a consistent effect on 
the subjective sensation of pain. Furthermore, in a second 
experiment where the skin conductance was recorded during 
noxious stimulations (either to the own or the alien hand), we 
demonstrated that the alien (embodied) hand can be able to 
elicit physiological reactions specific to the own hand 
(Garbarini et al., 2014).
(p.382) In these patients, we also investigated the motor 
domain (Garbarini et al., 2013b; Garbarini et al., 2015) and we 
asked whether, once an alien hand is embodied into the 
patient’s body schema, its representation can affect motor 
production and motor control as if it actually belonged to the 
patients. E+ patients were asked to execute a modified version 
of a bimanual Circles-Lines task (Franz & Ramachandran, 
1998; Garbarini et al., 2012; Garbarini et al., 2013; Garbarini 
et al., 2015; Piedimonte et al., 2014) in which they had to draw 
lines with their intact hand while watching an alien hand 
performing circles, either in an egocentric position, that is, 
congruent with the position of the patients’ left hand, or in an 
allocentric non-congruent position, that is, positioned opposite 
the patient. As in the previous experiment, the crucial aspect 
was that in the congruent condition E+ patients misidentified 
the alien hand as their own, while in the non-congruent 
condition patients’ recognize the alien hand as belonging to 
the co-experimenter. We hypothesized that, if the delusion of 
ownership arises from an abnormal embodiment process that 
automatically triggers the intention-programming processes 
for the own hand, when the alien hand drew circles in the 
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egocentric condition, the lines drawn by the E+ patients’ 
intact hand should become ovalized (coupling effect), as in 
normal individuals actually performing the bimanual task (see 
Figure 17.1). The E+ patients’ results verified these 
predictions, showing a clear coupling effect in the alien 
congruent (egocentric) condition, in which patients claimed 
having performed circles with their own left hand. It is 
important to note that, in the same condition, neither healthy 
controls nor hemiplegic patients without embodiment showed 
any coupling effect. This suggests that simply looking at a 
hand drawing circles is not sufficient to induce line 
ovalization.
In a different experiment (Garbarini et al., 2015), always 
related to the motor domain, we investigated in E+ patients 
the effect of tool-use training on length representation of their 
contralesional forearm. We know from the literature that an 
active tool-use can reshape one’s own body schema, extending 
peripersonal space and modulating the representation of 
related body parts (e.g., Sposito et al., 2012). In our task, an 
alien hand performed the tool-use training, acting either in a 
body-congruent position (aligned with the patients’ shoulder; 
where the pathological embodiment occurs) or in a no-
congruent position (misaligned with the patients’ where the 
pathological embodiment does not occur). Coherently, only in 
the body-congruent condition, when patients were convinced 
to perform the tool-use training with their own paralyzed arm, 
a significant overestimation effect was found.
These findings clearly showed that a profoundly altered sense 
of body ownership affects both motor awareness (E+ patients, 
usually aware of their motor impairment, were convinced that 
their left hand was moving) and sense of agency (E+ patients 
ascribed the alien movements to themselves), by directly
(p.383) modulating either the action execution (E+ patients 
showed an interference/coupling effect very similar to those 
found in healthy subjects actually performing bimanual 
Circles-Lines task) or the body length representation (E+ 
patients showed an overestimation effect very similar to those 
found in healthy subjects actually performing the tool-use 
training). It is important to emphasize that E+ patients, 
although similar to anosognosic patients in relation to the 
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presence of hemiplegia, are, however, behaviorally different. 
Indeed, in everyday situations they acknowledge their motor 
deficit, therefore showing normal motor awareness and motor 
monitoring. However, the presence of an alien hand in an 
egocentric position crucially affects their sensory-motor 
processes and motor consciousness. It is still to be clarified 
how this can happen. In the rubber hand illusion the 
discrepancy between visual, tactile, and proprioceptive input 
is resolved by the brain with the transient incorporation of the 
rubber hand into the (normal) subjects’ body schema. We may 
speculate that when the representation of the contralesional 
hand is partially impaired or made fragile by the brain 
damage, as in E+ patients, the brain solves the incoherence of 
the “mutilated” body representation by automatically 
incorporating an alien hand (when positioned in the egocentric 
space) so to regain consistency and functionality. As a 
consequence, the alien hand becomes part of the patients’ 
body representation, and starts to have an impact on the 
patients’ sensory-motor processes. This, in turn, modulates 
motor awareness and the sense of agency. Note that the alien 
hand embodiment is fully dependent on seeing the alien hand. 
However, vision is not fundamental per se, but is so only if the 
alien hand is in a position that is congruent with the patients’ 
body schema. Only in this condition does the image of the 
hand trigger a reconstruction of the patients’ body 
representation. The Circles-Lines task, employed in this 
experiment, allowed us to describe to what extent this 
modulation is effective. Our results showed that body parts 
belonging to other people can be so fully incorporated into 
one’s own body schema as to imply sensory-motor 
consequences on one’s own action execution.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed the relation between 
different components of motor cognition, capitalizing on 
recent findings obtained in brain-damaged patents. Pathology, 
integrated with data from healthy subjects, is fundamental for 
breaking with the accepted depiction of some mental 
processes. In particular, the traditional views on agency, 
intention, and motor awareness are challenged by the 
patients’ behavior described in the previous paragraphs. First, 
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it has been shown that under particular conditions, as occurs 
in anosognosic patients, the presence of normal motor 
intentionality is sufficient to construct (p.384) motor 
awareness for a given action in absence of any real movement 
execution. This confirms that full consciousness of a volitional 
motor act implies the activation of a cascade of motor events 
that construct motor awareness based on a combination of 
intention and prediction. Previous studies in healthy subjects 
had already raised this possibility. However, our results offer 
strong further support that we are aware of what we intend to 
do instead of what we really do (see also Fourneret & 
Jeannerod, 1998) Specifically, we found counterintuitive but 
objective consequences for the motor behavior of the 
unaffected hand due to programmed but not executed 
movement of the paralyzed hand (in AHP patients). In the AHP 
patients, the sense of agency seems to be “normal,” or at least 
conforms with the new body condition, insofar as the 
movement that they believe was executed is recognized as 
their own, that is, related to their own will. It is difficult to 
identify the precise neural signal denoting the sense of 
agency. However, it seems to be constructed from a “normal” 
integration of both intentionality and motor awareness, 
despite absence of actual movement: I have the intention to 
move, I feel that I move, therefore I am the one who is 
controlling the movements.
Even more intriguing is the relation between voluntary action, 
body sensation, and body ownership, which is at the core of 
humans’ sense of self. Here we described a pathological 
condition in which brain-damaged patients, under particular 
constraints, automatically embodied other people’s arms. 
Whatever anomaly leads to such a profound alteration of the 
sense of body ownership may be the crucial aspect of this false 
belief and its objective effects on the sensory-motor awareness 
of the patients. In absence of any kind of voluntary action, 
humans’ body ownership is built up through the interaction 
between afferences (e.g., proprioception and vision) and pre-
existing representations of the body. This integration, in 
health, allows people to distinguish their own bodies from 
those of others (and from the surrounding world). When a 
voluntary action is performed, efferent information is added to 
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this process. Hence, the match between efferences, 
afferences, and pre-existing body representations allows 
discrimination between our own actions and the actions of 
other people. Both afferences integration and efferent 
processes are affected in E+ patients, who, once they have 
embodied the “alien” arm, feel sensation on it (in absence of 
any real stimulation or afference) and feel that they move it (in 
absence of any real movement of their own limb, again in 
absence of any afferent feedback). Viewing the embodied alien 
arm moving seems to trigger the same motor cascade that 
leads from conscious intention to motor awareness, in healthy 
participants and in AHP patients. The system seems to 
respond to the moving alien arm as if the movement were 
initiated by the patients themselves. Once the cascade is 
triggered, the sense of agency is affected as well because E+ 
patients ascribe the observed movement to their own will. 
Again, (p.385) the sense of agency seems to be the result of a 
negotiation between intention and motor awareness: I have 
the intention to move, I feel that I move, therefore I am the 
one who is controlling the movements.
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